WHILE THE STUDY OF insurgency extends well over 100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small wars of the 19th century and beyond, almost no cross modal analysis—that is, dedicated insurgency form typology identification—has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying what differences and interrelationships existed. The reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free, democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian, communist, and centrally planned East.
With the end of the Cold War and the resulting ideological and economic implosion of the Soviet Union, post-Cold War insurgency typologies began to emerge because a need existed to understand where this component of the new global security environment was heading. Over 2 decades of research and writing have been focused on this endeavor by what is a relatively small number of insurgency practitioners and/or theorists. In addition, the works of some contemporary terrorism scholars are also relevant to this topical area of focus.
For this monograph to identify what can be considered new forms of insurgency that are developing, an appreciation for and understanding of earlier insurgency forms must also be articulated. With these thoughts in mind, this monograph will initially discuss what an insurgency is and some Western viewpoints on it, describe how terrorism analysis can potentially serve an indications and warnings (I&W) function, provide a literature review of the post-Cold War insurgency typologies that exist, create a proposed insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential insurgency forms, and finally provide strategic implications for U.S. defense policy as they relate to each of these forms. The work will also utilize a number of tables for organizational purposes and an endnotes section for scholarly citation requirements.
Pertaining to the insurgency and terrorism literature reviews conducted in this manuscript, the following terrorism and insurgency forms—form name(s), author(s), and year of publication—were analyzed in creating the final forms typology.
1995)
Derived from this analysis, the following insurgency forms with their starting dates in ( ) have been identified as well as the strategic implications of each form for U.S. defense policy.
Anarchist (1880s). Generally violent, anarchism has only been viewed as a form of terrorism (Rapoport, 2001) because the end state sought is governmental— even state—destruction. No replacement government or seizure of the state is being attempted nor is any form of subversion or co-option of state institutions or the parallel building of a shadow state taking place. Still, O’Neill (2005) designates this as an insurgency form and the insurgency outcome of state-destruction exists in a later typology created by Metz (2012).
Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is an anachronism with the threat potentials downgraded to that of sporadic periods of local unrest being generated by protesters outside of political conventions and financial summits and characterized by vandalism, aggravated assault, and arson. This is solely a U.S. domestic law enforcement issue focusing on riot control, investigation of criminal activities, and limited counterterrorism response. No U.S. military response is required.
Separatist—Internal and External (1920s). This insurgency form encompasses both separation from local authority—such as the original Irish Republican Army (IRA) gaining Irish independence from the United Kingdom in 1921—and the separation from foreign authority as took place in numerous regions during the decolonial period after the Second World War. Numerous theorists have identified this insurgency form, ranging from Cable’s (1993) defensive articulation through a number of others into Jones’s (2011) separatist and resistance types.
Strategic implications: Limited. This insurgency form now takes place only sporadically and to some extent has been replaced by more traditional secession ballot initiatives as have or may be seen in the future as taking place in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, and other locales. Still, the insurgencies of the 1990s that took place in the former Yugoslavia and the more recent secession of South Sudan in 2011 suggest this legacy form has not faded away. A possible U.S. military response may be required depending on the specific international incident taking place.
Maoist People’s (1930s). The most identifiable insurgency form is derived from Mao Zedong’s principles found in his 1937 work, On Guerrilla Warfare. This form, also known as “people’s war,” utilizes peasant armies that are drawn upon for an integrated and protracted politico-military phase strategy of eventual state takeover. A shadow or proto-state is created in parallel to the pre-existing one being targeted for elimination. This form has been identified by Metz (1993) as people’s war, by Beckett (2001) as revolutionary warfare, by O’Neill (2005) as egalitarian, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) as ideological.
Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is defunct. No U.S. military response is required.
Urban Left (Late-1960s). This insurgency form has been identified by a number of theorists and, as previously mentioned, is a continuation of earlier Marxist politico-military concepts with a more urbanized emphasis. Peasants no longer fight in the countryside or surround cities—their successors now engage in terrorist tactical actions within those cities. Metz’s (1993) urban insurrection—devoid the Iranian experience, Beckett’s (2001) urban and superpower based Soviet proxy component, Rapoport’s (2001) new-left, and Schnabel and Gunaratna’s (2006; 2015) ideological (which spans the earlier Marxist form and this one) all address this form.
Strategic implications: None to limited. This legacy insurgency form appears to be defunct, therefore, no U.S. military response is required. However, the promotion of such potentials by the Bolivarian alliance exists and could be facilitated by Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah, and/or Chinese support. Still, if this insurgency form should reappear, the impact is estimated to be limited. It would require varying U.S. Government agency involvement based on a situational response.
Radical Islamist (1979). The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the ensuing 444-day U.S. Embassy hostage crisis ushered in a new insurgency form derived from the perception that mosque and state are inexorably intertwined. The radical Islamist form has two variants—one Shia and the other Sunni based— and stems from the fact that Islam never underwent a historical reformation which ushered in secular political thought and a separation of the spheres of church (or mosque) and state. Scholars recognizing this insurgency form are Metz (1995) reactionary, Rapoport (2001) religious extremism, Kilcullen (2004) globalized Islamist, O’Neill (2005) reactionary-traditionalist, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) religious.
Strategic implications: Significant. Groups involved include Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Of all the presently active insurgency forms, this one has the most significant impact on U.S. defense policy as witnessed by the years of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing operations in Syria, Yemen, and numerous other locales. This insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement or the military (typically) as the designated lead. An allof-government approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form which possesses a terrorism component—utilizing both large scale and lone wolf attacks—representing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.
Liberal Democratic (1989). The removal of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe thereafter, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked not only the end to the Cold War but also the power of pluralist uprisings as the Polish Solidarity shipyard workers have shown. That liberal democracy could provide the basis for an insurgency form has been noted by both Beckett (2001), as the American component of the Cold War superpower based conflict, and also later by O’Neill (2005), more specifically within his pluralist form designation.
Strategic implications: Mixed (beneficial). This insurgency form should be viewed as an opportunity to extend democratic values rather than as an actual or potential threat of some sort to the United States or its allies. A variety of U.S. Government agencies may provide indirect and/or direct facilitation of such insurgencies. The one downside of this insurgency form is unintended second and third order effects—for example, U.S. support to the mostly defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) inadvertently strengthened the Islamic State (IS) by helping to weaken the Assad regime.
Criminal (Early-2000s). Elements and components of this insurgency form have been projected and identified by numerous scholars: Metz’s (1993) commercial, Clapham’s (1998) warlord, Sloan’s (1999) apolitical, Thom’s (1999) economic, Cilliers’s (2000) resourcebased, Tarr’s (2011) resource control, and Metz’s later (2012) non-political. Of these various articulations, Sullivan’s (2008) criminal designation—directly derived from Metz’s 1993 perceptions—has become the dominant one as it relates to the insurgent-like activities of the gangs and cartels in Mexico and Latin America.
Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. Typically, the groups involved in this insurgency form— Colombian and Mexican cartels, Central American gangs, and the Italian mafia—are viewed as a law enforcement concern. However, some of the African warlords and the more operationally capable cartel groups, such as Los Zetas and CJNG (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación), have overmatch capability to any law enforcement response. For the United States, the response to this insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement (typically) or the military as the designated lead. An all-of-government approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form that springs out of Mexico and is bringing corruption into U.S. border zones along with sporadic incidents of narco-terrorism.
Plutocratic (2008). Of all of the insurgency forms offered in this monograph, this may be one of the most contentious. It specifically views the rise of globalized capital devoid of any ties to the state—in essence, representative of an emerging form of 21st century postmodern capitalism—in direct conflict with earlier forms of 20th century state moderated capitalism promoted by liberal democratic governments. It views the rise of stateless multinational corporations, and the global elites (.001% to 1%) they serve as the major stakeholders, as insider insurgent threats to the international order. This insurgent form serves as a corollary to the preceding criminal form and represents another variant to Metz’s (1993) commercial articulation postulated by Bunker (2011).
Strategic implications: None presently. The U.S. military has no current role in the response to the rise of predatory global capitalism and the emerging “sovereign free” entities engaging in it. Rather, varying governmental agencies with a legalistic and economic mandate will be required to promote state moderated capitalist values and laws. Federal law enforcement agencies will be tasked to support such efforts as they relate to financial crimes, tax avoidance, and related offenses.
Blood Cultist (Emergent). The existence of this type of insurgency form has been recognized by a number of scholars (O’Neill, 2005; Kaplan, 2007; Lauder, 2009) primarily within the last decade and ultimately represents a fusion of criminality, spirituality, and barbarism. It is most recognizable with recent Islamic State activity involving mass ritual beheadings, crucifixions, child rape, and related atrocities and their “end of days” type of pursuits. Attributes of this insurgency form can also be found with the La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and Los Caballeros Templarios (The Knight’s Templars) cartels in Mexico which engage in Christian cultish behaviors and elements of Los Zetas and Cartel del Golfo that are involved in extreme forms of Santa Muerte worship which seek supernatural protection, death magic spells, power, and riches.